Language Policy at the Chinese National People’s Congress (NPC)
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China to Enshrine Xi-Era Ethnic Policy in New Law
by Chenghao Wei, NPC Observer (3/5/26)
The following is the introductory paragraph to the prospectus for the NPC's proceedings next week:
Next week, China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) is expected to adopt a Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress (Law) [民族团结进步促进法]—designed to codify General Secretary Xi Jinping’s new orthodoxy for governing China’s ethnic minorities. That doctrine, known as the “Important Thinking on Improving and Strengthening Ethnic Work,” reflects the “Second-Generation Ethnic Policies” promoted by several prominent scholars. In a nutshell, this new “assimilationist” approach aims “not just to strengthen citizens’ sense of belonging to a larger, unified Chinese nation under the Party but also to mute expression of other—in the Party’s view, competing—identities.”
Chapter II is where the plan focuses on language policy:
Chapter II (Building a Shared Spiritual Home)lays the ideological foundation for the assimilation project. It affirms the policy of fostering identification with “the great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture, the Communist Party of China, and socialism with Chinese characteristics” through patriotic education, education in official historical narratives, publicity of “the fine Zhonghua traditional culture,” and promotion of “Chinese cultural symbols and image of the Chinese nation” (arts. 11–14).
This Chapter then affords language and education particular attention. It incorporates the relevant rules of the newly revised Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese Language [国家通用语言文字法], but often goes beyond them. For instance, it codifies the goal of having preschoolers become proficient in Putonghua and requires that Chinese characters be displayed more prominently than minority scripts if both must be used in public (art. 15, paras. 2, 4). It also tasks the education and ethnic affairs ministries with developing textbooks on “the community of the Chinese nation,” while requiring all schools to integrate that concept into their curricula (art. 16, paras. 1–2; art. 18, para. 1). This Chapter does vow to support the standardization, digitization, and preservation of minority texts (art. 15, para. 5), but the goal of such investment is to “protect languages from being completely forgotten rather than protecting their ongoing, everyday use by living people.”
Finally, this Chapter broadly requires media, internet service providers, families, among others, to promote the Party’s ethnic policy (arts. 19–21). Parents are reminded of their duty to provide lawful family education and are prohibited from “instilling in minors ideas detrimental to ethnic unity and progress” (art. 20, para. 2).
There's not much ambiguity about where they're headed with regard to language.
Selected readings
- "NPC Delegate Proposes To End Foreign Language Translation" (5/31/20) — that was six years ago; it didn't happen
- "Badge of honor: Language Log is blocked in China" (12/26/19) — with an account of other major banned websites: Wikipedia (all languages), The Guardian, Al Jazeera, Hackernews, Imgur, Google, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and many other invaluable websites were already off-limits to Chinese citizens for years. The internet in China is severely decimated by the CCP government.
- "The Arithmetic of Party-Speak: The 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is just around the corner — and that means the machine of political discourse is humming away at high speed" (8/28/17).
- "The mind-numbing official-speak of the CCP" (8/29/17
[Thanks to June Teufel Dreyer]
Victor Mair said,
March 16, 2026 @ 12:49 am
China Passes Ethnic Unity Law, Raising Minority Rights Concerns
https://chinascope.org/archives/40328
On March 12, China’s National People’s Congress passed the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress. The legislation calls for greater integration among ethnic groups through policies related to education, housing, population mobility, community life, culture, tourism, and economic development. The law states that its goal is to strengthen national unity under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and foster a shared national identity among China’s 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities, as part of efforts to achieve the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Critics argue that the measure could further erode the identities of non-Han ethnic groups and potentially allow authorities to label those who question such “unity” as separatists subject to legal punishment.
The law stipulates that Mandarin will be the primary language used in schools as well as in government and official affairs. In public settings where Mandarin and minority languages are used together, the law requires that the national common language be given prominence in terms of placement and order. In practice, the legislation establishes at the national level that minority languages cannot serve as the primary language of instruction. In regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, authorities have already significantly reduced opportunities for students to receive education in their native languages, despite strong opposition and protests from students, teachers, and parents.
The law also prohibits interference with freedom of marriage on the grounds of ethnic identity, customs, or religious beliefs, with the stated aim of encouraging interethnic marriage. It further calls for the development of “inter-embedded community environments.” Some scholars warn that this policy could lead to the dispersal of ethnic minority communities, as it appears designed to encourage Han Chinese and other ethnic groups to move into each other’s neighborhoods.
The legislation also requires religious organizations, religious schools, and places of worship to “adhere to the direction of the Sinicization of religion.” Ethnic affairs are incorporated into China’s broader social governance framework, with provisions covering anti-separatism measures, border security, risk prevention, and social stability. The law also states that foreign organizations and individuals who engage in activities that undermine ethnic unity or incite ethnic division may face legal consequences.
Source: Deutsche Welle, March 12, 2026
https://www.dw.com/zh/中国人大通过民族团结进步促进法-引发少数民族人权担忧/a-76331516
Coby said,
March 16, 2026 @ 10:16 am
Is a distinction made between non-Sinitic and non-Mandarin Sinitic languages?
Victor Mair said,
March 16, 2026 @ 12:13 pm
@Coby
The PRC wants neither.
AntC said,
March 16, 2026 @ 8:29 pm
non-Mandarin Sinitic languages
Ethnic Chinese-majority countries outside China are doing their best to support non-Mandarin: Taiwan has public announcements in Hokkien and Hakka as well as Mandarin, and indeed has Hakka cultural centres dotted around the country. (I guess every street market counts as a Hokkien/Southern Min cultural centre ;-).
There's also State-sponsored support/cultural centres for the various Austronesian languages still spoken. (For example the swishy new train service on the tortuous East Coast line is named 'Puyuma Express', the stations are decorated with native art, and announcements include Puyuma.)
Taiwan since the crackdown in Hong Kong has tried to support Cantonese. The trouble is there's too small a number of speakers to constitute a critical mass.
Singapore's efforts to support Hokkien or Hakka have been weaker. (Lee Kuan Yew was not enthusiastic.) Again there's been a citizen-led movement to preserve the languages. A recent news item — curiously from the SCMP.
In general, as Prof Mair points out, the situation looks dire for the rich diversity of Sinitic languages, let alone Tibetan, Uyghur or Mongolian, etc. Wikip has an article 'Languages of China':
This must be some meaning of 'state support' I wasn't previously aware of. wikip's cite is to a dead link. The source has a Youtube site that appears to be a sock-puppet for the PRC.
John Swindle said,
March 17, 2026 @ 1:17 am
Is the South China Morning Post as a source for Singapore language news "curious" because it's not Singaporean or because it's under stricter government and party control now? It still seems pretty strong. I do sometimes get SCMP confused with SMBC (Saturday Morning Breakfast Cereal), though, which of course I was introduced to by Language Log.
AntC said,
March 17, 2026 @ 4:28 am
@JS, chiefly the latter, given how CCP has treated ex-news outlets like Apple Daily.
When I lived in HK (before the PRC takeover), the EngLang press was pretty boisterous, always poking fun at the pompous British/ 'Fat Pan'. I don't think SCMP would do that with PRC leadership.
I did also look ** for comment from Singaporean press (like the Straits Times), but it was mostly several years old. Here's an article in similar vein from a Sg outlet, from a couple of years ago. (I don't know how reliable is their reportage.)
Lee Kuan Yew's plan was to get Singaporeans fluent in both Mandarin and English (since acting as an entrepôt is its life-blood); and support the Malay *** and Indian minorities. I guess other Sinitic languages got pushed down the priorities.
** Or, of course, it's beyond my search skills and/or demonstrates further decline in the usefulness of the internet for non-commercial enquiries.
*** I was hugely impressed by Lee Hsien-Loong's weekly 'fireside chats' reporting the handling of Covid-19. In Mandarin; a sip of tea, then fluent English; another sip of tea, then fluent Malay.