Yankee Kinship Terminology: A Problem in Componential Analysis[1]

WARD H. GOODENOUGH
University of Pennsylvania

I

THE method of descriptive semantics known as "componential analysis" has been described and illustrated only in part (Goodenough 1956, 1957, 1964, Frake 1960, 1962; Wallace and Atkins 1960; Conklin 1962a, 1962b, 1964; Burling 1962, 1963, 1964a; Pospisil 1964). The number of reasonably adequate analyses published is very small (Goodenough 1956, 1964; Frake 1960; Conant 1961; Burling 1962, 1963; Conklin 1964; Pospisil 1960, 1964). Even in relation to kinship materials these few analyses hardly begin to illustrate the various operations that may be involved. The structure of componential matrices and the principles governing the manipulation of columns and rows within them have yet to be discussed. Only one such matrix has been published (Goodenough 1964). The use of equivalence rules and transformation rules in conjunction with componential analysis has not been explored.[2] As Wallace and Atkins (1960), Burling (1964a), and I (1956) have all observed, moreover, it is possible to devise at least several different models of the semantic structure of a terminological system, any one of which will predict adequately the permissible denotata[3] of its terms. The criteria by which one chooses one model over another, however, remain to be determined. The very fact that it is possible to construct more than one *valid* model of a semantic system has profound implications for cultural theory, calling into question the anthropological premise that a society's culture is "shared" by its members.[4] Until these matters are more fully explored, debates about the relationship of componential analysis to cognitive processes (Burling 1964a, 1964b; Hymes 1964; Frake 1964) must remain inconclusive.

This account of Yankee kinship settles none of these questions. It is offered as a contribution toward their clarification and ultimate resolution.

II

The kinship terminology analyzed here is the one with which I grew up and with which I continue to operate. It is not shared by all North Americans or by all native speakers of English. I have encountered many fellow Americans who reckon degrees of cousinship differently and others who confine cousins to ego's generation entirely, regarding all collaterals in their parents' generation as their aunts and uncles rather than as their cousins. There are evidently significant subcultural differences not only in the selection of linguistic forms to designate the same relationships—as with the preference in much of

the southern United States for *daddy* over *father* as a standard term of reference—but in the classes of kin types[5] that a given term may designate.

III

That I have been my own informant should require no apology. Indeed, it has been exceedingly useful, for it has helped me to discover some of the criteria for rejecting what appear to be minimally adequate componential models.

Considering only the distribution of kin terms with respect to consanguineal kin types, I arrived at a "solution" of Yankee terminology similar to that published by Wallace (1962). It made a basic three-way cut of the universe of kin types in terms of degree of collaterality, with a "lineal" set, a "first-degree collateral" set (including the designata of *aunt*, *uncle*, *nephew*, *niece*, *brother*, *sister*), and a "second or further-degree collateral" set (consisting of the designatum of *cousin*). The lineal and first-degree collateral sets were further partitioned by considerations of generation removal, generation seniority, and sex of alter in the relationship. The model perfectly predicted the consanguineal kin types that were permissible denotata of the terms, but it bothered me. It didn't feel right to have the major taxonomic level in the system (as represented by degree of collaterality) separating the terms *brother* and *sister* from *father*, *mother*, *son*, and *daughter*, with which I felt they somehow belonged as a distinct subset of terms. Grouping them with *aunt*, *uncle*, *nephew* and *niece* just didn't sit right.

An analysis that does violence to the informant's subjective feel for the appropriateness of things is presumably suspect, especially if a satisfactory alternative analysis is available with which the informant is more comfortable. That there was objective structural reason for my discomfort in this case became apparent when I undertook an analysis that included affinal as well as consanguineal kin types. The terms *brother* and *sister* had to be considered as part of a subset with the terms *father*, *mother*, *son*, and *daughter* because, like them, they were subject to transforming operations signalled by the affixes *step-* and *-in-law*, and at the same time no other terms were subject to these transforming operations. This observation made it immediately apparent that Yankee terminology consists of a set of basic terms and of another set of expressions that are derivatives of the basic terms. The basic terms fall into distinctive subsets according to the kinds of derivatives that can be built on them. By insisting that analysis preserve the integrity of these subsets, I arrived at the componential models presented here. What preserving the integrity of subsets means operationally can be demonstrated readily in the course of analysis when we consider the structure of componential matrices.

By dealing with my own kinship terminology, then, and serving as my own informant, I was able to objectivize something in my own culture for which I had had only a subjective "feel." I should add that my first rough formulation of componential analysis as a method (Goodenough 1951:103–110) was in response to an effort to make objective something about Trukese kinship for

which I had developed a subjective feel also. I knew that some Trukese kinship terms went together to form a system of terminology and that others were what I called "special" terms that did not fit into the system. By what criteria was I deciding that some terms were special and that others belonged together in a system of terms? It presumably involved the way in which the meanings (to me) of the terms were interrelated structurally. My effort to find a way of making these interrelationships explicit opened up for me the possibility of a rigorous descriptive semantics. My own experience leads me to conclude that asking questions of oneself as an informant is not necessarily an unsound procedure. On the contrary, it can be highly productive, especially if it allows us to convert subjective and intuitive processes within us into objectivized analytical operations.

IV

Ordinarily it is my objective as an English-speaking ethnographer to describe in English the culture of a non-English speaking people for the information of fellow speakers of English, who presumably know no more about the culture described than I did before I went out and tried to learn it. Such an account inevitably appears highly informative to those who read it. By contrast, an account of my own culture in my own language must appear highly uninformative to fellow speakers of English with much the same culture. It says what the audience already largely knows. Interest focuses on the variations of detail that reveal subcultural differences between ethnographer and audience. The ethnographer is inclined to omit consideration of the things that would be most informative to someone entirely unfamiliar with the culture he is describing. The language of description in this case, moreover, is at the same time a code for the cultural concepts described. Unless special care is taken, description can lapse into meaningless tautology.

To avoid these pitfalls and to make my account comparable with my accounts of alien cultures, I have taken as my audience a reader for whom English is a second language. Until now he has attributed to English kinship terminology, insofar as he has encountered it at all, significations corresponding to the meanings of kinship terms in his native language and culture. My object is to explain to him the meanings of my kinship terms.

The utility of this approach is obvious. One test of the adequacy of this account, I have said, is that it not do violence to my own feel, as informant, for the structure of what is described. This is the subjective test of adequacy. An equally important test is that it provide an alien with the knowledge he needs to use my kinship terminology in a way I will accept as corresponding with the way I use it. This is the objective test of adequacy. An account is deficient to the extent that it fails the test.

V

The description and analysis presented here are concerned only with kinship expressions used in reference. The data analyzed, furthermore, have only to do with the situation in which someone inquires of another, not in the

presence of the person being inquired about, "What kin relationship, if any, is he (she) to you?" This invites the answer, "He (she) is my ____," or "He (she) is not a relative." The importance of controlling the context in which data are elicited is obvious when one considers how personal considerations affect the use of kinship terms in address[6] or in the presence of the person being inquired about, as illustrated by Schneider and Homans (1955). As this controlling question suggests, I am concerned in this paper with the context in which information is asked and truthfully given about the nature of the kin connection between two persons.

The number of possible answers is finite. To establish levels of contrast, we can then ask for any relative, "Is she (he) your ____?" in connection with every expression. The answer can be "Yes" or "No" (with a qualification to be noted below). When the same person can be referred to by more than one kinship expression, the several expressions are synonyms, belong to different terminological systems relating to the same domain (not a problem in the present case), or are at different levels of contrast in the taxonomy of kin relationships (as with *uncle* and *mother's brother*). Otherwise, the informant can trace his relationship to the person in question in different ways; a different kin type is in fact being denoted by each kinship expression (as when one of the informant's kinsmen has married another).

Some of the expressions we obtain are lexemes in that they signify what cannot be predicted from the significata and arrangement of their constituent parts (Goodenough 1956:199, 206–208). Others are not lexemes, having significata that may be understood as relative products of lexemes. Thus *uncle* and *halfbrother* are lexemes, but *mother's brother* is not. Analysis need be concerned only with the lexemes of a terminological system, since their relative products need no further definition.

VI

A system of kin relationships rests on the established institutions and customs relating to membership in households, sexual rights, the definition of procreation, the legitimization of progeny as members of a jural community, and the like. My own kinship system is no exception. The very definition of kin-types requires that we take account of certain principles of family organization in my particular subculture.

Kinship is regarded as following from biological procreation. Conception is seen as resulting from a single sexual union of a man as genitor and woman as genetrix; and prenatal growth is independent of subsequent sexual unions. My culture allows for an individual to have only one genitor as well as only one genetrix, unlike Lakalai culture in New Britain, which allows for the possibility that several men may be cogenitors of the same individual. My culture also disallows the possibility of conception without a genitor, unlike Trobriand Island culture, which has the dogma that men play no essential part in procreation (Malinowski 1932). Each individual must have a genitor as well as a genetrix.

As genitor and genetrix of joint progeny, a man and woman are supposed to have established a common household independent of the household of any other adults. Following traditional procedures known as *marriage* they are supposed to have entered into lifelong agreement to maintain such a household, to confine their sexual relations to one another, and to be jointly responsible for the care, socialization, education, and sponsorship of their joint progeny. No man may be married to more than one woman, or woman to more than one man, at a time. Remarriage by the survivor following the death of his (her) marriage partner is permitted. Although marriage is ideally for life, there are formal procedures for terminating a marriage, *divorce* and *annulment*, after which a man and woman are free to marry again. The common household established by a marriage is dissolved following a divorce or annulment.

The male partner to a marriage is the female partner's *husband* and the female partner is the male partner's *wife*. A husband and wife refer to their joint male progeny as their *son*, to their female progeny as their *daughter*, and to their collective progeny as their *children*. They are their progeny's *father* (genitor)[7] and *mother* (genetrix) respectively and their progeny's *parents* collectively. The joint progeny refer to one another as their *brother* (if the person referred to is male) and their *sister* (if the person referred to is female).

A married man and woman are a single social unit whose solidarity, joint interests, and responsibilities take precedence over obligations and interests either may have in any other relationship. Their relations to their dependent progeny might appear to be an exception to this principle, but ideally their obligations to their progeny are joint and cannot be in conflict with their mutual interests. The unity of married pairs extends to almost all aspects of kin relationships and to many aspects of social relationships generally. Whatever obligation a person may have to kinsmen, for example, his marriage partner must share that obligation as well. A man should be as prepared to give financial aid to a dependent kinsman of his partner as to one of his own.

The foregoing ideal of what is supposed to be does not always obtain in fact. A man and woman may establish a common household without having gone through a formal marriage. Their marriage may be dissolved, formally or informally. Men and women may have sexual relations and procreate with other than their marriage partners. Responsibility for the care, socialization, education, and sponsorship of progeny may be assumed by other than the genitor and genetrix. The cultural principles for classifying kin relationships necessarily take account of such departures from the ideal.

As it turns out, the biological connections of genitor and progeny and of genetrix and progeny take priority, when publicly acknowledged, except under special and very limited conditions. They provide a principle that no ego may acknowledge a relationship with more than one person at a time as *his father* or *his mother*. Furthermore, no ego may ever establish more than one such relationship, except by legal adoption, in which the previous relationship is in effect formally dissolved. The original relationship thus established need

not be with the *genitor* or *genetrix*, but once established so that a person says "She is my mother" in answer to the question "What relationship is she to you?," the same answer cannot ever be given with reference to another person (provided, of course, that the person referred to is not within hearing).[8] Only of the genitor and genetrix, finally, can it be said "He (she) is my true (real) father (mother)."

Beyond the relationships between members of the same immediate family is a wider set in which there are ascribed dependency obligations and rights for as long as either party to the relationship lives. And beyond this is another set of relationships in which their are no such lifetime obligations. These categories of relationship can best be described after we have analyzed the kinship terminology.

VII

The lexemes that can be obtained in answer to the question that provides the context for this analysis are presented herewith. After each are listed the denotata that follow from the assumption that biological procreation, marriage, and social responsibility for progeny all go together according to the ideal pattern and usual expectation. The kin-type notation used for this is:

Hu—ego's male partner in marriage
Wi—ego's female partner in marriage
Sp—either Hu or Wi
Fa—ego's genitor
Mo—ego's genetrix
Pa—either Fa or Mo
So—ego's male progeny
Da—ego's female progeny
Ch—either So or Da
Br—male who has same genitor and same genetrix as ego, as distinct from FaSo or MoSo
Si—female who has same genitor and same genetrix as ego, as distinct from FaDa and MoDa
Sb—either Br or Si

All other denotata are represented as relative products of these, e.g. FaBrSo, SpSbCh. Following the denotata noted in this fashion are descriptions of how the kinship terms are used when usual expectations about biological procreation, marriage, etc., are not met.

1. *My father:* Fa. A male who has succeeded ego's genitor by virtue of legal adoption, or who otherwise has fully assumed the genitor's place, provided ego has not previously established a positive relationship with the genitor as *my father* and provided the genitor has fully abdicated (by death or otherwise) all public responsibility for ego, and provided further that ego has been incorporated into the nuclear family of the genitor's substitute. Thus *my father* may sometimes be used for someone who would otherwise be 7 (*my stepfather*) or 19 (*my foster father*), but only under the conditions just indicated. Only of the genitor may it be said "He is my true (real) father." The term *father* may be applied to God and to priests, but these may never be referred to as *my father* and are therefore excluded as possible denotata of "He is my father" in answer to the control question "What relationship is he to you?"

2. *My mother:* Mo. A female who has succeeded ego's genetrix by virtue of legal adoption, or who otherwise has fully assumed the genetrix' place, provided ego has not already established a positive relationship with the genetrix as *my mother* and the genetrix has fully abdicated all public responsibility for ego, and provided further that ego has been incorporated into the nuclear family of the genetrix' substitute. Thus *my mother* may sometimes be used for someone who would otherwise be 8 (*my stepmother*) or 20 (*my foster mother*). Only of the genetrix may it be said "She is my true (real) mother."

3. *My son:* So. Male adoptee.

4. *My daughter:* Da. Female adoptee. The terms *my son* and *my daughter* are always properly used for the biological male and female progeny respectively. They may also be used for an alter who has been incorporated into the nuclear family of which ego is male or female head and for whom ego has become a parental substitute as indicated in connection with terms 1 and 2.

5. *My brother*$_1$: Br, FaSo, MoSo. A male with the same genitor or same genetrix, or both, as ego. A male who has been incorporated into the same nuclear family of orientation as ego so that he, with ego, refers to the same person as *my father* or *my mother* in answer to the control question. Thus *my brother* may sometimes be used for a *stepbrother* (11) or a *foster brother* (23).

5a. *My brother*$_2$: Br. A male with both the same genitor and the same genetrix as ego. It is synonymous with 5b, and on the same level of contrast with 5c, designating a subclass of the designatum of *my brother*$_1$.

5b. *My full brother* or *my fullbrother:* Br. A synonym of 5a. Stress and juncture patterns indicate that this may be either two words or one word in my dialect.

5c. *My halfbrother:* FaSo, MoSo. A male with either the same genitor or the same genetrix as ego, but not both. This is one word in my dialect. Terms 5a, 5b, and 5c are not at the same level of contrast with 5. In response to the question "Is he your brother?" ego cannot say "No, he is my halfbrother" (i.e. not *my brother*$_1$ but some other kind of relative), but can only say "Yes," or "Yes, he is my halfbrother" (i.e. *my brother*$_1$ and the kind of brother who is *my halfbrother*). By way of contrast, it is possible to answer the question "Is he your brother?" by saying "No, he is my stepbrother." This illustrates what may prove to be a useful device in componential analysis. With kinship terms at the same level of contrast, the only possible answers to the question "Is he your A?" are "Yes, he is my A" or "No, he is my B." In such case either A and B are in direct contrast in the same semantic domain or they belong to contrasting domains altogether ("Is he your brother?" "No, he's a stranger"). But if the answer to the question "Is he your A?" is "Yes, he is my B," then B and A are at different levels of contrast within the same semantic domain, B standing for a taxonomic subdivision of A. Thus, to the question "Is he your child?" one can answer "Yes, he is my son," but not "No, he is my son." For this reason it is evident that the designatum of *my halfbrother* is a subset of the designatum of *my brother*$_1$. But we must take account of a further complication. In answer to the question "Is he your son?" it is not possible to say

"No, he is my child." But in answer to the question "Is he your halfbrother?" it is possible to say "No, he is my brother" interchangeably with "No, he is my full brother." This requires us to recognize that the term *my brother* has two distinct designata, one a subset of the other. Therefore, I have listed *my brother*$_2$ (term 5a) as a homonym of *my brother*$_1$ (term 5).

6. *My sister*$_1$*:* Si, FaDa, MoDa. A female with the same genitor or same genetrix, or both, as ego. A female so incorporated into the same nuclear family of orientation as ego that she, with ego, refers to the same person as *my father* or *my mother* in answer to the control question. Thus *my sister*$_1$ may sometimes be used for a *stepsister* (12) or *foster sister* (24).

6a. *My sister*$_2$*:* Si. A female with both the same genitor and the same genetrix as ego.

6b. *My full sister* or *fullsister:* Si. This is a synonym of 6a. It may be two words or one word in my dialect.

6c. *My halfsister:* FaDa, MoDa. This is one word in my dialect. The same considerations govern the designata of terms 6, 6a, 6b, and 6c as govern terms 5, 5a, 5b, and 5c.

7. *My stepfather:* MoHu, when MoHu is not also ego's genitor and when ego has already established a relationship with the genitor as *my father*. Terms 7–12 are each one word in my dialect.

8. *My stepmother:* FaWi, when FaWi is not also ego's genetrix and when ego has already established a relationship with the genetrix as *my mother*.

9. *My stepson:* SpSo, when ego is not genitor or genetrix and has not become for alter someone who is *my father* or *my mother*.

10. *My stepdaughter:* SpDa, when ego is not genitor or genetrix and has not become for alter someone who is *my father* or *my mother*.

11. *My stepbrother:* PaSpSo who is not also PaSo, and when both ego and alter would not refer to the same person in answer to the control question as *my father* or *my mother*.

12. *My stepsister:* PaSpDa who is not also PaDa, and when both ego and alter would not refer to the same person in answer to the control question as *my father* or *my mother*.

13. *My father-in-law:* SpFa, SpMoHu (if married to SpMo before the marriage of ego and if SpFa is dead or in no way functioning as SpFa).

14. *My mother-in-law:* SpMo, SpFaWi (if married to SpFa before ego's marriage and if SpMo is dead or in no way functioning as SpMo).

15. *My son-in-law:* DaHu, SpDaHu (if married to SpDa after ego's marriage to Sp, and if Sp's former Sp is dead or in no way functioning as a parent to SpDa).

16. *My daughter-in-law:* SoWi, SpSoWi (if married to SpSo after ego's marriage to Sp, and if Sp's former Sp is dead or in no way functioning as a parent to SpSo).

17. *My brother-in-law:* SpBr, SpPaSo, SpPaSpSo (if SpPaSp is referred to as 13 or 14), SiHu, PaDaHu, PaSpDaHu (if alter refers to ego's Pa as 13 or

14). Anyone whom ego's Sp refers to as *my brother*$_1$ in answer to the control question, or Hu of anyone whom ego refers to as *my sister*$_1$.

18. *My sister-in-law:* SpSi, SpPaDa, SpPaSpDa (if SpPaSp is referred to as 13 or 14), BrWi, PaSoWi, PaSpSoWi (if alter refers to ego's Pa as 13 or 14). Anyone whom ego's Sp refers to as *my sister*$_1$ in answer to the control question, or Wi of anyone whom ego refers to as *my brother*$_1$.

19. *My foster father.* Male head of a household in which ego has been incorporated as a dependent juvenile member, but not legally adopted, and when ego has or has had a relationship to someone else as *my father.*

20. *My foster mother.* Female head of a household in which ego has been incorporated as dependent member, but not legally adopted, and when ego has or has had a relationship to someone else as *my mother.*

21. *My foster son.* Any male juvenile incorporated as a dependent member of the household of which ego is male or female head, and for whom ego is neither 1, 2, 7, or 8.

22. *My foster daughter.* Any female juvenile incorporated as a dependent member of the household of which ego is male or female head, and for whom ego is neither 1, 2, 7, or 8.

23. *My foster brother.* Any male who has been incorporated as a juvenile dependent into the household in which ego is also a juvenile dependent or who is a juvenile dependent in the household into which ego has been incorporated as such.

24. *My foster sister.* Any female who has been incorporated as a juvenile dependent into the household in which ego is also a juvenile dependent or who is a juvenile dependent in the household into which ego has been incorporated as such.

25. *My husband:* Hu. A man with whom a female ego has established a common household and assumed the joint responsibilities associated with the marriage agreement without having actually entered into a formal marriage.

26. *My wife:* Wi. A woman with whom a male ego has established a common household and assumed the joint responsibilities associated with the marriage agreement without having actually entered into a formal marriage.

27. *My uncle:* PaBr, PaPaSo, PaSiHu, PaPaDaHu. Anyone to whom ego's Pa refers as *my brother*$_1$ or *my brother-in-law.* A PaSi's or PaPaDa's second Hu is less assuredly *my uncle* than the first Hu if ego has already established a relationship with the first Hu as *my uncle.* I may not refer to PaPaBr as *my uncle,* but must use the construction *my great uncle* in answer to the control question (contrast with Conklin 1964:39).

28. *My aunt:* PaSi, PaPaDa, PaBrWi, PaPaSoWi. Anyone to whom ego's Pa refers as *my sister*$_1$ or *my sister-in-law.* A PaBr's or PaPaSo's second Wi is less assuredly *my aunt* than the first Wi if ego has already established a relationship with the first Wi as *my aunt.* I may not refer to PaPaSi as *my aunt* in answer to the control question.

29. *My nephew:* SbSo, PaChSo, SpSbSo, SpPaChSo. Anyone who is 3 to

anyone who is ego's 5, 6, 17, or 18. I may not refer to my SbChSo as *my nephew*.

30. *My niece:* SbDa, PaChDa, SpSbDa, SpPaChDa. Anyone who is 4 to anyone who is ego's 5, 6, 17, or 18. I may not refer to my SbChDa as *my niece*.

31. *My grandfather:* PaFa. Anyone who is *my father* to ego's 1 or 2. Terms 31–34 are each one word in my dialect. I may not refer to my PaPaFa as *my grandfather*.

32. *My grandmother:* PaMo. Anyone who is *my mother* to ego's 1 or 2. I may not refer to my PaPaMo as *my grandmother*.

33. *My grandson:* ChSo. Anyone who is *my son* to ego's 3 or 4. I may not refer to my ChChSo as *my grandson*.

34. *My grandaughter:* ChDa. Anyone who is *my daughter* to ego's 3 or 4. I may not refer to my ChChDa as *my granddaughter*.

35. *My cousin:* PaSbCh, PaPaChCh. Any 41 (*descendant*) of the 5 or 6 of any 1, 2, 31, 32, 39 (*ancestor*), or 40 (*ancestress*), without regard to whether ego and alter are in the same or different generations.

36. There is a theoretically infinite set of expressions involving terms 27–34 (*uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, grandfather, grandmother, grandson, granddaughter*) modified by the adjective *great* or repeated applications thereof: e.g. *great grandfather, great great grandson, great great great uncle*. In my dialect the adjective *grand* is substituted for *great* as the modifier immediately preceding *nephew* and *niece* (*grand nephew, great grand nephew*, etc.) but nowhere else.[9] What these expressions denote are kin types exactly like the ones denoted by the unmodified base terms, except that the generation distance between ego and alter is increased by one for each *great* (*grand*) in the expression: e.g. *my great grandfather* (PaPaFa), *my great great grandmother* (PaPaPaMo), *my great grandson* (ChChSo), *my great great granddaughter* (ChChChDa), *my great uncle* (PaPaBr, PaPaPaSo), *my great grand niece* (SbChChDa, PaChChChDa). There is considerable dialect difference in the handling of these kinship terms. It is important to emphasize, therefore, that in my dialect such expressions as *my great uncle* and *my grand nephew* are not one word, as revealed by juncture and stress accent, and are not to be equated with *my grandfather* and *my grandson*.[10] Because the modifier *great* (*grand*) always has the same semantic effect of increasing the generation distance between ego and alter without otherwise changing the nature of the relationship, we may treat it as a distinct lexeme with a specific semantic function. Its function needs to be analyzed, but the many expressions in which it enters need not be treated as distinct lexemes in the basic corpus of kinship terms.

37. There is another set of kinship expressions that may be formed with term 35 (*cousin*) and the numerical adjectives *first, second, third*, etc., as in *my second cousin*. These are separate words in my dialect. The number selected corresponds to the lesser number of generations separating ego and alter from the sibling pair through whom they are consanguineally linked. Thus

my first cousin may denote PaSbCh (including PaPaChCh), PaPaSbCh, PaPaPaSbCh, PaSbChCh, PaSbChChCh, etc., and *my second cousin* may denote PaPaSbChCh (including PaPaPaChChCh), PaPaPaSbChCh, PaPaPaPaSbChCh, PaPaSbChChCh, PaPaSbChChChCh, etc. None of these expressions may denote relationships that may not also be denoted simply as *my cousin*. They designate subclasses of the class of kin types designated by *my cousin*. None of the kinship expressions formed with these numerical adjectives are lexemes. They need not, therefore, be included in the basic corpus of kinship terms.

38. The expressions *once removed*, *twice removed*, *three times removed*, etc , may be added to expressions constructed with *first*, *second*, etc , in combination with term 35 (*cousin*). The number of times *removed* designates the number of generations separating ego and alter. Thus *my second cousin once removed* denotes PaPaPaSbChCh or PaPaSbChChCh. These expressions designate subclasses of the designata of expressions formed with *first*, *second*, etc.[11]

There are some additional terms that belong with the set of expressions obtainable in answer to the question "What relationship is he (she) to you?" But they are secondary in that they are employed only in situations where ego is not readily able to specify the relationship by means of expressions formed with *my grandfather*, *my grandmother*, *my grandson*, or *my granddaughter*, together with *great* (repeated the appropriate number of times).

39. *My ancestor:* PaPaFa, PaPaPaFa, PaPaPaPaFa. Any male more than two generations removed at the senior end of the procreative chain of which ego is at the junior end.

40. *My ancestress:* PaPaMo, PaPaPaMo, PaPaPaPaMo. Any female more than two generations removed at the senior end of the procreative chain of which ego is at the junior end.

41. (*My descendant*): ChChCh, ChChChCh, ChChChChCh. Anyone more than two generations removed at the junior end of a procreative chain of which ego is at the senior end. Normally the occasion would not arise for any living ego to say "my descendant" in answer to the question "What relationship is he to you?" But it is appropriate to say "His descendant" in answer to the question "What relationship is he to him?"

Excluded from analysis because they are not fully appropriate as answers to the question "What relationship is he (she) to you?" are such kinship terms as *parent*, *grandparent*, *child*, *grandchild*, *sibling*, *spouse*, *forefather*. The linguistic and nonlinguistic (contextual) frames in which these expressions occur overlap in varying degrees with the frames in which the terms here enumerated may occur, but they do not coincide with them.[12]

Also excluded from consideration are all expressions that are relative products of the enumerated terms—*my mother's brother*, *my wife's uncle*, etc., —since they are not unit lexemes. Their denotata are predictable from a knowledge of the significata of their constituent lexemes.

VIII

Analysis starts with the observation that the terms listed fall into several obvious groups. Some of these groups appear to be derivatives of others.

GROUP 1 consists of the terms 1–6 (*my father*, *my mother*, *my son*, *my daughter*, *my brother*, *my sister*). All and only these terms may be compounded properly with *step-*, *-in-law*, and *foster* to form derivative groups of terms (1a, 1b, and 1c). None of these terms may enter into constructions with the adjectives *great* or *grand*, a fact not contradicted by *grandfather*, *grandmother*, *grandson*, and *granddaughter*, which, as noted, are single words and not two words in an adjective+noun construction. None of the terms in this group may enter into constructions with the numeral adjectives *first*, *second*, *third*, etc. These observations sharply segregate this group from groups 2 and 3 below.

GROUP 2 consists of terms 27–34 (*my uncle*, *my aunt*, *my nephew*, *my niece*, *my grandfather*, *my grandmother*, *my grandson*, *my granddaughter*). All and only the terms in this group may enter into constructions with the adjective *great* (*grand*) to form the open-ended set of derivative terms of which *my great grandfather*, *my great uncle*, *my great great grand niece* are examples. None of the terms in this group may combine properly with *step-*, *-in-law*, *foster* or enter into constructions with the numerical adjectives *first*, *second*, etc. Expressions like *my step grandmother* and *my uncle-in-law* are meaningful to me as analogical formations, but I do not use them myself and do not accept them as standard in my culture.

GROUP 3 contains only term 35 (*my cousin*). This term alone may enter into constructions with the numerical adjectives *first*, *second*, *third*, etc., and with the expressions *once removed*, *twice removed*, etc. It may not enter into constructions with *step-*, *-in-law*, *foster*, or *great* (*grand*).

GROUP 4 consists of terms 25 and 26 (*my husband*, *my wife*). Unlike the terms in groups 1, 2, and 3, its terms may denote only affinal kin-types. They may not enter into constructions with *step-*, *-in-law*, *foster*, or *great*. Such expressions as *my first wife*, *my second husband* may occur, but here the adjectives *first*, *second*, etc., refer to temporal order of monogamous marriages and not to degree of collateral removal. Furthermore, one would never say in answer to the control question "What relationship is she to you?" that "She is my first (second) wife." "She was my first (second) wife," or "She is my former wife," or "She is my wife" are the appropriate answers to this question. We can say, therefore, that the numeral adjectives *first*, *second*, etc., with which these terms can form constructions, are the standard ordinal adjectives relating to temporal sequence and are to be considered as different lexemes from their homonyms that refer to degrees on a scale of collateral distance.

GROUP 5 consists of the secondary set of terms 39–41 (*my ancestor*, *my ancestress*, *my descendant*).

The remaining groups of terms are derivatives of the foregoing: group 1a

(terms 7–12 with *step-*), group 1b (terms 13–18 with *-in-law*), group 1c (terms 19–24 with *foster*), group 2a (terms formed with *great*).

The distribution of affinal as distinct from consanguineal kin-types in these groups raises a problem at the outset of analysis. With one exception the primary groups of terms denote either exclusively consanguineal kin types (groups 1, 3, 5) or exclusively affinal kin types (group 4). Group 2 and group 2a terms denote mainly consanguineal, but also a restricted set of affinal, kin types. This inclusion of both consanguineal and affinal kin types among the denotata of terms in groups 2 and 2a suggests that analysis should deal simultaneously with consanguineal and affinal relationships. On the other hand the

TABLE I. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GROUPS OF TERMS

Terms denoting consanguineal bases	Terms denoting affinal derivatives	Terms denoting other derivatives
(ego)	Group 4	—
Group 1	Group 1a Group 1b	Group 1c
Group 2	Group 2 in part	—
Group 2a	Group 2a in part	—
Group 3	—	—
Group 5	—	—

derivative groups 1a and 1b refer exclusively to affinal kin types in contrast with group 1, which refers exclusively to consanguineal kin types. Looking at group 1 and its derivatives, we find it convenient to analyze the terminology for consanguineal kin types first and then to treat the terminology for affinal kin types as derivatives or extensions of it.

The trouble with this is that group 4 then stands out as a derivative set of terms apparently without a consanguineal base from which to be derived. As it turns out, however, this is not a problem, because group 4 stands in the same relation to "ego" as groups 1b and 1c stand in relation to group 1. According to the strategy adopted for analysis, then, the groups of terms distribute with respect to consanguineal-affinal distinctions as shown in Table I.

Table II shows how groups 1, 2a, and 3 (the ones denoting consanguineal kin-types) distribute on a genealogical chart. It is immediately evident from the distribution that group 3 stands in complementary opposition to a supergroup consisting of groups 1, 2, and 2a. The difference between them is of the same kind as discussed above in connection with the difference between *first, second, third*, etc., as modifiers of *my cousin*—the lesser number of generations separating ego and alter from the nearest genitor (genetrix) or progenitor

TABLE II. DISTRIBUTION OF YANKEE KINSHIP TERMS



Note: The numbers on the genealogical chart represent the groups of kinship terms listed in section VIII, not including groups 4 and 5, or the derivative groups 1a, 1b, and 1c. Each vertical or diagonal line represents a lineal link and each horizontal line a lateral link.

they have in common. If the lesser number of generations is zero, ego and alter are in a lineal relationship; if the lesser number of generations is one, they are first-degree collaterals; if the lesser number is two, they are second-degree collaterals, etc. The dividing line between the denotata of group 3 and those of the other groups is not between collateral and lineal relationships, however, but between relationships that are two or more degrees of collateral distance as against those that are less than two degrees distant. All of the former relationships, and only these, are referred to by the group 3 term, *my cousin*.

It appears then that one of the discriminant variables in the Yankee kinship terminology is:

1. Degree of collateral distance between ego and alter, with the values;
   1.1 less than two degrees of distance (groups 1, 2, 2a, 5),
   1.2 two or more degrees of distance (group 3).

It remains to find a discriminant variable or variables that will differentiate groups 1, 2, 2a, and 5. It is evident that the denotata of group 5 constitute a subclass of the denotata of group 2a. Therefore we may set group 5 aside and concentrate on the difference(s) between groups 1, 2, and 2a. Inspection of Table II suggests that they differ according to what we may call genealogical distance from ego. If we define a unit of genealogical distance (marked by the solid lines in Table II) vertically as the space between a genitor or genetrix and his or her progeny and horizontally as the distance between two individuals with a genitor in common, then all kin types denoted by terms in group 1 are one unit of distance from ego; all kin types denoted by terms in group 2 are two units of distance from ego; and all kin types denoted by terms in group 2a are three or more units of distance from ego. Moreover, within group 2a the denotata of expressions with only one *great/grand* are three units of distance from ego; expressions with a *great great/great grand* denote kintypes that are four units of distance from ego; and so on with an additional unit of distance being added for each additional *great*. We assume, furthermore, that the marriage tie does not count as a unit of geneaological distance, but only a vertical or horizontal consanguineal link as just defined. Thus FaBr and FaBrWi are both two units of distance away from ego, and Br, BrWi, and WiBr are one unit of distance away.

Genealogical distance provides a conceptual variable that includes ego as one of its complementary values, for ego is necessarily at zero distance from himself on a genealogical tree. Hu and Wi are also at zero distance from ego. Thus ego is one of the consanguineal categories from which affinal terminology can be derived, as was suggested in Table I.

These considerations lead us to postulate as a discriminant variable in the Yankee kinship system:

2. Degree of genealogical distance between ego and alter, with the values;
   2.1 zero distance (ego),
   2.2 one unit of distance (group 1),
   2.3 two units of distance (group 2),
   2.4 three or more units of distance (groups 2a, 5).

The results of analysis so far are shown in Table III.

From here on, analysis deals with variables that differentiate terms within the several groups. It is at this point that alternative ways of conceptualizing the semantic structure become readily feasible.

We may, for example, sort the terms in group 1 according to:

3. Generation seniority, with the values;
   3.1 alter in a senior generation (*my father*, *my mother*),
   3.2 alter in ego's generation (*my brother*$_1$, *my sister*$_1$),
   3.3 alter in a junior generation (*my son*, *my daughter*).

On the other hand we may sort them according to:

4. Lineality of relationship, with the values;
   4.1 alter and ego in lineal relationship (*my father*, *my mother*, *my son*, *my daughter*),
   4.2 alter and ego not in lineal relationship (*my brother*$_1$, *my sister*$_1$).

TABLE III

Terms	Discriminant Variables		Derivatives
	1	2	
(ego)	1.1	2.1	Group 4
Group 1	1.1	2.2	Groups 1a, 1b, 1c
Group 2	1.1	2.3	
Groups 2a, 5	1.1	2.4	
Group 3	1.2	—	

Variable 4 requires that we then use some variable to distinguish *my father* and *my mother* from *my son* and *my daughter*. This can be variable 3, now with only two values:

5. Generation seniority, with the values;
   5.1 alter in senior generation (*my father*, *my mother*),
   5.2 alter in junior generation (*my son*, *my daughter*).

Which, if either, solution is preferable depends on the best means of handling the distinctions within group 2.

In any event it is obvious that the remaining distinctions to be made all can be handled by reference to the sex of alter. This discrimination applies equally to the terms in groups 2, 2a, 4, 1a, 1b, and 1c:

6. Sex of alter, with the values;
   6.1 alter male (*my father*, *my brother*$_1$, *my son*, *my grandfather*, *my uncle*, *my grandson*, *my nephew*, *my husband*, etc.),
   6.2 alter female (*my mother*, *my sister*$_1$, *my daughter*, *my grandmother*, *my aunt*, *my granddaughter*, *my niece*, *my wife*, etc.).

For the terms in group 2 there is clearly a distinction that must be made in terms of variable 5 (generation seniority), with 5.1 (senior generation) including *my grandfather*, *my grandmother*, *my uncle*, *my aunt*, and 5.2 (junior generation) including *my grandson*, *my granddaughter*, *my nephew*, *my niece*.

This establishes variable 5 as one we will want to use for terms in group 1 as well.

Following the precedent established in group 1 we may then distinguish the terms in group 2 according to variable 4 (lineality) with 4.1 (lineal) including *my grandfather*, *my grandmother*, *my grandson*, *my granddaughter*, and 4.2 (not lineal) including *my uncle*, *my aunt*, *my nephew*, and *my niece*.

This approach will give us the paradigm for groups 1, 2, and 3 as shown in Table IV.

TABLE IV

Discriminant Variables					Kinship Terms
1	2	4	5	6	
1.1	2.1	—	—	—	ego
1.1	2.2	4.1	5.1	6.1	my father
1.1	2.2	4.1	5.1	6.2	my mother
1.1	2.2	4.1	5.2	6.1	my son
1.1	2.2	4.1	5.2	6.2	my daughter
1.1	2.2	4.2	—	6.1	my brother_1
1.1	2.2	4.2	—	6.2	my sister_1
1.1	2.3	4.1	5.1	6.1	my grandfather
1.1	2.3	4.1	5.1	6.2	my grandmother
1.1	2.3	4.1	5.2	6.1	my grandson
1.1	2.3	4.1	5.2	6.2	my granddaughter
1.1	2.3	4.2	5.1	6.1	my uncle
1.1	2.3	4.2	5.1	6.2	my aunt
1.1	2.3	4.2	5.2	6.1	my nephew
1.1	2.3	4.2	5.2	6.2	my niece
1.2	—	—	—	—	my cousin

There is another approach available to us. Instead of differentiating the sets of kin types designated by the terms in groups 1 and 2 with reference to discriminant variable 4 (lineality), we can do so with reference to:

7. Relative nearness of alter's generation to ego's, with the values;
   7.1 alter in the nearer generation (*my* $\textit{brother}_1$, *my* $\textit{sister}_1$, *my uncle*, *my aunt*, *my nephew*, *my niece*),
   7.2 alter in the farther generation (*my father*, *my mother*, *my son*, *my daughter*, *my grandfather*, *my grandmother*, *my grandson*, *my granddaughter*).

This approach gives the paradigm for groups 1 and 2 shown in Table V.

The use of variable 4 in Table IV has the effect of distributing the terms in rows within each group so that those designating collaterally more-distant kin types come after those designating collaterally nearer kin types. The effect

of variable 7 in Table V is to rearrange the rows so that within each group the terms designating generationally more-distant kin types come after those designating generationally closer ones. So far there is no basis for choosing one of these models over the other. Each preserves the integrity of groups 1 and 2 and is acceptable from this point of view. The difference is that one emphasizes collateral and the other generational distance. If analysis of the rest of the terminology indicates that one of these emphases fits the data better than the other, the choice between them is clear. Otherwise these emphases remain

TABLE V

Discriminant variables					Kinship terms
1	2	7	5	6	
1.1	2.1	—	—	—	ego
1.1	2.2	7.1	—	6.1	my brother$_1$
1.1	2.2	7.1	—	6.2	my sister$_1$
1.1	2.2	7.2	5.1	6.1	my father
1.1	2.2	7.2	5.1	6.2	my mother
1.1	2.2	7.2	5.2	6.1	my son
1.1	2.2	7.2	5.2	6.2	my daughter
1.1	2.3	7.1	5.1	6.1	my uncle
1.1	2.3	7.1	5.1	6.2	my aunt
1.1	2.3	7.1	5.2	6.1	my nephew
1.1	2.3	7.1	5.2	6.2	my niece
1.1	2.3	7.2	5.1	6.1	my grandfather
1.1	2.3	7.2	5.1	6.2	my grandmother
1.1	2.3	7.2	5.2	6.1	my grandson
1.1	2.3	7.2	5.2	6.2	my granddaughter
1.2	—	—	—	—	my cousin

two perfectly adequate ways of thinking about the data. Since we are talking about my culture, and I am obviously able to think in terms of either model, it cannot be argued that one is truly in my culture and the other not. Both are in my culture, and both are illustrative of how I conceptualize kin relationships, even though one model may order the totality of kin relationships more neatly than the other.

Either construction readily enables us to handle the derivative set of terms in group 2a. For either one the same derivational rule may be given:

Rule 1. Each possible kinship expression in group 2a designates a set of kin types identical in all respects with the kin types designated by the corresponding expression in group 2 except that it is as many more units of genealogical distance removed from ego as the number of times the adjective *great* (or *grand*) is used in the expression.

For either of the two constructions shown in Tables IV and V we may use an alternative derivational rule in which we substitute *generations removed* for the words *units of genealogical distance removed.* The former phrasing is in keeping with variable 2 and has the esthetic advantage that the number of repetitions of *great* is the same for both lineal and nonlineal alters (regardless of their generational distance), which makes the phrasing especially attractive for the construction given in Table IV, where linearity is used as a variable. On the other hand, the second phrasing of the derivational rule is in keeping with the recognition of generation as a factor in the alternative construction shown in Table V. In this phrasing the number of repetitions of *great* does not indicate the same number of generations that alter is distant from ego in both lineal and nonlineal relationships, but this is no problem in the construction in Table V, because lineality is not a relevant factor there.

It seems, then, that either phrasing of the derivational rule is adequate, but the first phrasing is more consistent with the use of variable 4 (lineality) in Table IV and the second is more consistent with the use of variable 7 (relative nearness of generation) in Table V.

IX

The affinal relationships covered by single kinship lexemes are severely limited in extent. They do not include any relationships in which there is more than one marital tie between ego and alter, nor do they include any relationships in which ego and alter are two or more degrees distant collaterally or separated by more than two units of genealogical distance.

Affinal relationships can be readily described by means of derivational rules. We consider first the expressions with *step-* in group 1a.

The cultural ideal for family organization produces an expectation that ordinarily certain affinal kin types will be filled by the same persons as fill certain consanguineal kin types. Such convergent kin types, though conceptually different, may be called "structurally equivalent" (Goodenough 1964:231–232). In Yankee kinship terminology we are interested in the affinal kin types that are structurally equivalent to consanguineal kin types one unit of geneaological distance from ego, where in normal expectation FaWi = Mo, MoHu = Fa, SpSo = So, SpDa = Da, PaSpSo = Br, and PaSpDa = Si. With this in mind we may state the derivational rule for group 1a as:

Rule 2. Any affinal kin type that is structurally equivalent to a consanguineal kin type denoted by a term in group 1 is denoted by an expression consisting of the corresponding term in group 1 with the prefix *step-*.

Similar considerations enable us to state the derivational rule for the set of expressions in group 1c:

Rule 3. Any relationship that is by virtue of common residence in the same household behaviorally equivalent to a relationship denoted by a term in group 1, but not also structurally equivalent to it, is denoted by the corresponding term in group 1 with the adjective *foster*.

The derivational rules for the remaining affinal relationships follow.

Rule 4. Affinal kin types that are at zero genealogical distance from ego are designated by the terms *my husband* (if alter is male) and *my wife* (if alter is female).

Rule 5. Affinal kin types that are at one unit of genealogical distance from ego and that are not structurally equivalent to consanguineal kin types are differentiated by the same discriminant variables as differentiate consanguineal kin types in group 1, and the resulting sets of kin types are designated by the corresponding terms in group 1 with the suffix *-in-law*.

Rule 6. Affinal kin types that are two or more units of genealogical distance from ego are differentiated by the same discriminant variables as differentiate consanguineal kin types in groups 2 and 2a, and the resulting sets of kin types are designated by the corresponding terms in groups 2 and 2a provided that (a) the affinal tie directly involves the senior party to the relationship and (b) the senior party is the first person in the particular relationship, or its structural equivalent, with whom the junior party has established a relationship as such; otherwise, these kin types are not denoted by kinship lexemes but by two or more lexemes in descriptive constructions (e.g. *my wife's uncle, my son-in-law's brother, my grandmother's husband, my uncle's wife*).

Rule 7. Affinal kin types that are more than one degree of collateral distance from ego are not denoted by any kinship lexemes but by two or more lexemes in descriptive constructions (e.g. *my cousin's wife, my husband's cousin*).

X

We may take the considerations expressed in the foregoing derivational rules and treat them as discriminant variables in a componential matrix:

8. Presence of a marital tie between ego and alter (relations with more than one tie are not covered by kinship lexemes), with the values;
   - 8.1 marital tie absent (ego, groups 1, 2 in part, 2a in part, 3),
   - 8.2 marital tie present (groups 4, 1a, 1b, 2 in part, 2a in part).
9. Structural equivalence of alter's kin type to a primary consanguineal kin type, with the values;
   - 9.1 alter's kin type structurally equivalent to a primary consanguineal kin type (group 1a),
   - 9.2 alter's kin type not structurally equivalent to a primary consanguineal kin type (group 1b).
10. Involvement of senior party to relationship in marital tie, with the values;
    - 10.1 senior party involved (groups 2 in part, 2a in part),
    - 10.2 senior party not involved (no lexemes).
11. Primacy of senior party to relationship as person whom junior party has actually known in the relationship, with the values;
    - 11.1 senior party first person in the particular relationship known to junior party (groups 2 in part, 2a in part),
    - 11.2 senior party not first person in the particular relationship known to junior party (no lexemes).

With these additional variables we can put all the affinal terminology into the same componential paradigm with the consanguineal terminology provided we rephrase discriminant variable 2 as "degree of genealogical distance between ego and alter or alter's structural equivalent." This is necessary in order to keep *my stepbrother* and *my stepsister* within the group of kin types that are one unit of genealogical distance away from ego. The resulting paradigm appears in Table VI.

XI

Other terms not covered in Table VI can be handled as substitutes for terms in Table VI. Thus such expressions as *my halfbrother*, *my halfsister*, *my*

TABLE VI

Discriminant Variables									
1	2	8	9	10	11	4	5	6	Kinship terms
1.1	2.1	8.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	ego
1.1	2.1	8.2	—	—	—	—	—	6.1	my husband
1.1	2.1	8.2	—	—	—	—	—	6.2	my wife
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	my father
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	my mother
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	my son
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	my daughter
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	6.1	my brother_1
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	6.2	my sister_1
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	my stepfather
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	my stepmother
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	my stepson
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	my stepdaughter
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.2	—	6.1	my stepbrother
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.2	—	6.2	my stepsister
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	my father-in-law
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	my mother-in-law
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	my son-in-law
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	my daughter-in-law
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.2	—	6.1	my brother-in-law
1.1	2.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.2	—	6.2	my sister-in-law
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	my grandfather
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	my grandmother
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	my grandson
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	my granddaughter
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.1	my uncle
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.2	my aunt
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.1	my nephew
1.1	2.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.2	my niece
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.1	5.1	6.1	my grandfather
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.1	5.1	6.2	my grandmother
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.1	5.2	6.1	my grandson
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.1	5.2	6.2	my granddaughter
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.2	5.1	6.1	my uncle
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.2	5.1	6.2	my aunt
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.2	5.2	6.1	my nephew
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	4.2	5.2	6.2	my niece
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.2	—	—	—	descriptive only
1.1	2.3	8.2	—	10.2	—	—	—	—	descriptive only
1.1	2.4	8.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	group 2a terms
1.1	2.4	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	—	—	—	group 2a terms
1.1	2.4	8.2	—	10.1	11.2	—	—	—	descriptive only
1.1	2.4	8.2	—	10.2	—	—	—	—	descriptive only
1.2	—	8.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	my cousin
1.2	—	8.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	descriptive only

TABLE VII

Discriminant variables										Kinship terms
1	2	8	9	10	11	4	5	4	6	
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	4.1	6.1	my brother$_2$
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	4.1	6.2	my sister$_2$
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	4.2	6.1	my halfbrother
1.1	2.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	4.2	6.2	my halfsister

brother$_2$, or *my full brother*, *my sister*$_2$ or *my full sister*, can be substituted in Table VI for the terms *my brother*$_1$ and *my sister*$_1$ and differentiated with the addition of discriminant variable 4.

4. Number of parents in common, with the values;
   4.1 both parents in common,
   4.2 only one parent in common.

Table VII shows the set of rows now substitutable for *my brother*$_1$ and *my sister*$_1$ in Table VI.

We must answer the question why we chose to include the pair of terms *my brother*$_1$ and *my sister*$_1$ in the main paradigm shown in Table VI rather than their substitutes as shown in Table VII. What puts the former in the "main sequence" (if I may call it that) rather than the latter? An obvious reason is that the expressions in Table VII are not subject to the operations *step-*, *-in-law*, and *foster*, and do not, therefore, belong with *my father*, *my mother*, *my son*, and *my daughter* in the same way that *my brother*$_1$ and *my sister*$_1$ do.

The set of terms in group 5 (*my ancestor*, *my ancestress*, *my descendant*) can be substituted for the expressions denoting lineal consanguineal kin-types in group 2a (e.g. *my great grandfather*, *my great great granddaughter*) as shown in Table VIII.

XII

If we were to use the alternative componential model, involving discriminant variable 7 instead of variable 4, it would be impossible to treat the terms in group 5 as substitutes for expressions in group 2a as we just did. No discriminations would be made then on the basis of lineality, but this is precisely what discriminates group 2a kin types covered by group 5 terms from those

TABLE VIII

Discriminant variables									Kinship terms
1	2	8	9	10	11	4	5	6	
1.1	2.4	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	my ancestor
1.1	2.4	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	my ancestress
1.1	2.4	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	—	my descendent

not so covered. This leads us to prefer the componential model utilizing variable 4 to that utilizing variable 7.

We should note, however, that if we were to use variable 7 the blocks of terms in Table VI would remain unchanged. The effect would be to rearrange the terms within each block so that 4.2 (7.1) terms would now come ahead of the 4.1 (7.2) terms as closer to ego. The collaterally more distant to ego would now be seen as the generationally closer. Thus the possibilities for alternative componential models of my own version of Yankee kinship terminology are limited to a minor sector of the semantic structure of the system as a whole. Alternative models that would have a more radical effect on the semantic structure can be constructed only by violating the canons of analysis—in this case at the expense of the integrity of the sets of terms comprising the blocks in Table VI, an integrity we felt it necessary to preserve in order to reveal the structural relationships that the *step-*, *-in-law*, and *great* sets of expressions have with the basic sets of which they are derivatives.

XIII

The semantic structure of Yankee kinship revealed in Table VI fits perfectly the distinction to which I referred earlier between relationships outside the immediate (nuclear) family in which lifelong obligations obtain and those in which they do not. All relationships within two degrees of collaterality (1.1 relationships) have ascribed lifelong obligations, whereas all relationships two or more degrees distant collaterally (1.2 relationships), the ones covered by the term *my cousin*, have no ascribed lifelong obligations other than a show of cordiality. Even among first cousins within the same generation there are no demands beyond this that they can make upon one another by virtue of cousinship alone. The extent to which they chose to cultivate their relationship beyond this is entirely optional. Cousins tend to have dealings with one another, therefore, by virtue of the 1.1 relatives they have in common. Given the facts of human longevity and reproduction, common 1.1 relatives bring first cousins in the same generation together much more frequently than they do any other cousins. In practice, therefore, people tend to have dealings mainly with their contemporary first cousins. When the common 1.1 relatives who bring them together have all died, there cease to be occasions for their having dealings with one another except as residential proximity, mutual friendship, or sentiment about the importance of kinship may promote them. They are no longer comembers of anyone's more immediate personal kindred based on 1.1 relationships.

That there are basic lexemes only for consanguineal kinsmen in the 1.1 set who are less than three units of genealogical removal from ego also accords with the pattern of kinship obligation. Responsibility for pre-adult children—for their survival needs, emotional development, socialization, enculturation, and education—rests first upon their fathers and mothers, their primary senior relatives. Those on whom these responsibilities next fall are the secondary senior relatives. It rarely happens that a tertiary senior relative has any

occasion to assume such responsibility, though a great uncle and great aunt are sometimes called upon to do so. Thus the basic lexemes cover those relationships in which dependency rights and duties are primarily and secondarily active. Similarly, responsibility for care of the aged falls primarily on their own sons and daughters and secondarily on their grandsons, granddaughters, nephews, and nieces. An old person is rarely without junior relatives nearer than grand nephews or grand nieces on whom he can depend, and the latter are not likely to be old enough and well enough established to be able to help care for them. Thus the basic lexemes cover those relationships in which dependency rights and duties have first and second priority and are active in practice, and the relationships in group 2a (those involving *great*) are the ones in which dependency rights and duties have tertiary or remoter priority and have little chance of activation.

XIV

An examination of other subcultural variations in terminology also can prove helpful in arriving at a componential model of a particular one. I have not tried systematically to explore variations of Yankee terminology. We will know more about them as the results of D. M. Schneider's current study of American kinship are published. One variant with which I am familiar, however, will help clarify the semantic structure of the one under analysis here.

It differs in that the terms *my aunt*, *my uncle*, *my nephew*, and *my niece* may be extended up and down the generations to any nonlineal 1.1 relatives other than those in ego's generation (*my brother* and *my sister*). The terms *my grandfather*, *my grandmother*, *my grandson*, and *my granddaughter*, however, cannot be extended in like manner to more remote lineal relatives. For these the use of *great* for the appropriate number of times is obligatory. The result of this variation requires us to introduce a new discriminant variable and modify the values for an old one (variable 2) as follows:

12. Degree of genealogical distance between ego and alter (replacing old variable 2), with the values;
    12.1 zero distance between ego and alter,
    12.2 one unit of genealogical distance between ego and alter,
    12.3 more than one unit of distance between ego and alter.
13. Number of units of genealogical distance between ego and alter beyond one, with the values;
    13.1 one,
    13.2 two,
    13.3 three,
    etc.

Omitting consideration of affinal terminology, our analysis of this variant gives the paradigm for consanguineal kin shown in Table IX.

It would be tempting here to put all the lineals (4.1) in one group and the nonlineals (4.2) together in another, as in the analysis published by Wallace (1962); but this is avoided to preserve the integrity of the set of terms for primary consanguines still needed as a base for handling the affinal terminology. Such a procedure would also obscure the way the discriminant

TABLE IX

Discriminant variables						Kinship terms
1	12	4	5	6	13	
1.1	12.1	—	—	—	—	ego
1.1	12.2	4.1	5.1	6.1	—	my father
1.1	12.2	4.1	5.1	6.2	—	my mother
1.1	12.2	4.1	5.2	6.1	—	my son
1.1	12.2	4.1	5.2	6.2	—	my daughter
1.1	12.2	4.2	—	6.1	—	my brother$_1$
1.1	12.2	4.2	—	6.2	—	my sister$_1$
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.1	6.1	13.1	my grandfather
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.1	6.1	13.2	my great grandfather
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.1	6.1	13.3	my great great grandfather
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.1	6.2	13.1	my grandmother
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.1	6.2	13.2	my great grandmother
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.1	6.2	13.3	my great great grandmother
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.2	6.1	13.1	my grandson
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.2	6.1	13.2	my great grandson
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.2	6.1	13.3	my great great grandson
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.2	6.2	13.1	my granddaughter
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.2	6.2	13.2	my great granddaughter
1.1	12.3	4.1	5.2	6.2	13.3	my great great granddaughter
1.1	12.3	4.2	5.1	6.1	—	my uncle
1.1	12.3	4.2	5.1	6.2	—	my aunt
1.1	12.3	4.2	5.2	6.1	—	my nephew
1.1	12.3	4.2	5.2	6.2	—	my niece
1.2	—	—	—	—	—	my cousin

variables intersect to produce blocks of terms which correspond with the boundary between the nuclear family and the personal kindred beyond it that includes relatives to whom lifetime obligations are owed. Variable 12 (like variable 2 in Table VI) is needed to preserve the integrity of these sets. We see here how considerations of kin-group membership, and even the way in which duties distribute over the field of kin types, can serve to delineate blocks of terms whose integrity we must seek to preserve in analysis. Pospisil (1964:400–401) has called attention to the utility of considering duty distributions as a means for selecting among alternative discriminant variables and for deciding the order in which the variables should appear as columns in the matrix table or paradigm showing the internal structure of the semantic system.

A major difference between Table IX and Table VI is that Table IX brings the group 2a terms together in the same block with the group 2 terms. The

necessity for this is dictated by the different distribution of *my uncle*, *my aunt*, *my nephew*, and *my niece* over the field of kin types. It led me to set up variable 13 (corresponding to derivational rule 1 above) as something separate from variable 12 and to reduce the number of values for the old variable 2 (new variable 12). The results more closely accord with the fact that both group 2a and group 2 relatives are in the same kindred circle of relationships in which lifelong obligations obtain. This suggests that we might wish to reconsider my own version of Yankee kinship in the light of variables 12 and 13.

The results appear in Table X. In effect they incorporate the meaning of *great* (derivational rule 1) into the paradigm through the addition of variable 13. Its placement in the extreme right-hand column of the table consolidates groups 2 and 2a rather than keeping them as separate blocks, one a derivative of the other. The variables in the first two left-hand columns segregate the terms, as marked by the horizontal lines, into four major groups, exactly like those in Table IX, corresponding to the major concentric circles of kinsmen in ego's personal kindred. That the terms for affinal kin-types fit so perfectly within the same fourfold division underscores the primacy in Yankee kinship of the relationship between husband and wife together as alter egos at the center of their respective and overlapping personal kindreds.

Because Table X has the same structural organization as Table IX, comparison of the two shows exactly wherein the subcultural variants of Yankee kinship usage differ from one another: on the extent to which the application of variable 13 is obligatory. By considering variant systems and attempting to find ways of structuring them so that their differences and similarities are expressed most clearly and precisely in the resulting paradigms, we have found yet another aid to arriving at componential models that do optimal justice to the phenomena of study.

It is also evident from a comparison of Tables IX and X that the basic structure of Yankee kinship is the same in each. When sufficient data on the various subcultural variants are available, comparison of their componential structures will show us to what extent they all have the same basic organization. We can then see with much greater precision than has been possible heretofore the relationship between variations in basic semantic structure of the terminological systems and variations in the social and behavioral organization of kin relationships—in the ways, that is, in which duties and group memberships distribute over the field of kin types.

There is a problem arising in the model presented in Table X that does not arise as clearly in Table VI. The terms in group 5 refer only to lineal kin types that are more than two units of genealogical distance away from ego, that is to the lineal kin types in group 2a. In Table VI we can see group 5 as a substitute for the lineals in 2a, which is clearly segregated in the paradigm from group 2. But in Table X groups 2 and 2a are merged into a single block of terms whose boundaries do not correspond with those of group 5. We cannot fit group 5 as a substitute for any contiguous set of terms in Table X.

This implies that there are some aspects of the kinship terminology for

TABLE X

Discriminant variables										Kinship terms
1	12	8	9	10	11	4	5	6	13	
1.1	12.1	8.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	ego
1.1	12.1	8.2	—	—	—	—	—	6.1	—	my husband
1.1	12.1	8.2	—	—	—	—	—	6.2	—	my wife
1.1	12.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	—	my father
1.1	12.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	—	my mother
1.1	12.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	—	my son
1.1	12.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	—	my daughter
1.1	12.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	6.1	—	my brother$_1$
1.1	12.2	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	—	6.2	—	my sister$_1$
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	—	my stepfather
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	—	my stepmother
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	—	my stepson
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	—	my stepdaughter
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.2	—	6.1	—	my stepbrother
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.1	—	—	4.2	—	6.2	—	my stepsister
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	—	my father-in-law
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	—	my mother-in-law
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	—	my son-in-law
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	—	my daughter-in-law
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.2	—	6.1	—	my brother-in-law
1.1	12.2	8.2	9.2	—	—	4.2	—	6.2	—	my sister-in-law
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	13.1	my grandfather
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	13.2	my great grandfather
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.1	13.3	my great great grandfather
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	13.1	my grandmother
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	13.2	my great grandmother
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.1	6.2	13.3	my great great grandmother
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	13.1	my grandson
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	13.2	my great grandson
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.1	13.3	my great great grandson
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	13.1	my granddaughter
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	13.2	my great granddaughter
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.1	5.2	6.2	13.3	my great great granddaughter
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.1	13.1	my uncle
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.1	13.2	my great uncle
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.1	13.3	my great great uncle
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.2	13.1	my aunt
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.2	13.2	my great aunt
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.1	6.2	13.3	my great great aunt
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.1	13.1	my nephew
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.1	13.2	my grand nephew
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.1	13.3	my great grand nephew
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.2	13.1	my niece
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.2	13.2	my grand niece
1.1	12.3	8.1	—	—	—	4.2	5.2	6.2	13.3	my great grand niece
1.1	12.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.1	—	—	—	—	same as above
1.1	12.3	8.2	—	10.1	11.2	—	—	—	—	descriptive only
1.1	12.3	8.2	—	10.2	—	—	—	—	—	descriptive only
1.2	—	8.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	my cousin
1.2	—	8.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	descriptive only

which the paradigm in Table VI appears to be a "truer" model, and there are others for which the paradigm in Table X appears to be "truer." One model brings out one aspect of the semantic structure and another brings out another, but both aspects cannot be readily brought out in the same model.

XV

The exercise presented here illustrates my concept of the contribution of componential analysis to anthropological and behavioral science.

It enables us to summarize in a succinct way what we think we know about the categorical organization of phenomenal domains as revealed by the use of linguistic labels for the categories within them. It forces us to be precise and rigorous in stating what we think we know, thereby helping us to clarify to ourselves our knowledge and its limitations. The results of analysis, as illustrated in Table X, portray in an objective manner complicated relationships for which otherwise we have only a subjective feel. These relationships and the structures they form thus are made much more amenable to systematic comparison for scientific purposes. Componential analysis provides a means for evaluating the adequacy of ethnographic statements regarding the cultural organizations of phenomena we presume other people to have. It imposes a set of standards or quality controls on the collection and processing of ethnographic data, thereby making it easier for independent investigators to replicate one another's data and analytical conclusions. It should be easy for any reader to test the extent to which the model of Yankee kinship here presented fits his own subculture, for example. If he analyzes his own kinship terminology using the same control question and following the same procedures and canons of analysis, we shall be in a position to undertake comparisons that are far more controlled than any made by anthropologists to date.

NOTES

[1] The analysis presented in this paper was undertaken as part of a research project entitled "Componential analysis of kin relationships," supported by the National Institute of Mental Health, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (Grant numbers M-6126 and MH-06126-02).

[2] For the use of an equivalence rule in conjunction with componential analysis, see my handling of generation skewing in Truk (Goodenough 1956). For the systematic use of equivalence rules as a partial alternative to componential analysis, see the important paper by Lounsbury (1964a).

[3] The denotatum of any given utterance of a word is what the word points to (denotes). As I see it, this is never a "thing" but a perception or conception of something, i.e. something that is discriminated ideationally or sensually as such from what it is not. Denotata are minimal classes or categories of real or imagined objects, events, and relationships. Following Morris' (1946) usage, the set of possible denotata for a word is its designatum, a more general class of which any particular denotatum is a member. The criteria for being in the class are what the word signifies, its significatum. The semantic components are the various criteria that in combination comprise a word's significatum. These criteria are the contrasting values of perceptual or conceptual variables. Any discrimination necessarily sorts phenomena into at least two complementary classes, e.g. male and female. The criss-crossing of several such discriminations partitions a larger perceptual or conceptual universe into subuniverses. If each subuniverse is labeled with a word, then the

set of labels for all the subuniverses is a terminological system, in which the significatum of any one label is made up of the particular values of the particular variables that discriminate the subuniverse it designates from all the other subuniverses in the universe. Componential analysis systematically contrasts the sets of denotata of the labels in a terminological system in order to arrive at hypotheses regarding the variables and their values that will most elegantly predict all of their respective denotata. The result is an inductively developed and validated "model" of the conceptual organization of an ideational domain, regardless of how accurately it represents the actual conceptual organization in other than the analyst's "head."

[4] For extensive discussions of this question see Wallace (1961:29–41) and Goodenough (1963:257–264).

[5] By a kin type is meant any category of relationship which can be conceived as differing in any way from another. For notational purposes it is convenient to follow Murdock (1949:133–134) and use as a base the eight genealogically closest relationships designated in standard English (father—Fa, mother—Mo, son—So, daughter—Da, brother—Br, sister—Si, husband—Hu, wife—Wi), specifying kin types as relative products of these (e.g. FaBrWi) with such additional distinctions according to relative age, sex of ego, etc., as may be necessary to handle a particular body of data.

[6] Terms of address are likely to form different terminological systems from terms of reference, as has been illustrated by Conant (1961)

[7] The genitor is the husband of the genetrix at the time of conception. If some other man is in fact the genitor, the husband of the genetrix can do one of only two things—disown the child and divorce his wife in doing so, or keep this wife and the child. He cannot disown the child and keep his wife.

[8] Thus I would refer to my stepfather as "my father" in his presence, but as "my stepfather" otherwise, unless he were the only person with whom I had established a relationship as my father, in which case I could refer to him as "my father" even when he was not present.

[9] Two of my acquaintances who grew up in Long Island use *grand* as the adjective immediately preceding *uncle* and *aunt* as well. The forms *grand uncle* and *grand aunt*, stressed as two words though written as one, also appear in Merriam-Webster (1961).

[10] In my dialect the pattern of stress and juncture in *my grand nephew* is the same as in *my great uncle* and *my great grandfather* and is not the same as in *my grandfather*. Contrast this with Conklin's (1964:39–55) treatment of what he gives as *granduncle*, *grandaunt*, *grandnephew*, and *grandniece* in his dialect. (Merriam-Webster 1961 gives these four forms spelled in this way, but with stress marks showing that *grand* is in each case a separate word.) He sees them as terms of the same order as *grandfather*, *grandmother*, *grandson*, and *granddaughter*. In such a dialect the results of componential analysis differ from those to be presented here.

[11] There is a widespread subculture in the northeastern United States in which the expressions *once removed*, *twice removed*, etc., have no meaning. In this subculture the expressions *first cousin*, *second cousin*, etc., relate to generation distance as well as to collateral distance between ego and alter. One adds to the degree of collateral distance the number of generations removed in order to arrive at the appropriate numerical adjective. Thus a PaPaPaSbCh would be my *third cousin* by this system of reckoning, instead of being *my first cousin twice removed*, as in my subculture. I should add that this is a difference of which many people are unaware. For many people any relatives beyond first cousins in their own generation are for all practical purposes beyond the range of kinship discourse so that they are uncertain as to how to classify them except as *distant cousins*.

[12] I do not imply that these are not kinship terms or that I would not consider them in a broader treatment of Yankee kinship. Comparison of the different contextual frames in which kinship terms are used and examination of how the denotata of the same terms shift from context to context and of what terms are limited to what contexts would be required in a fuller discussion. Since all but *forefather* are patently cover-terms resulting from the omission of sex distinctions, their inclusion would not affect the analysis presented here or the conclusions drawn from it.